Korea has been bleating about being the hub of this, that and everything for more than five years. The only discernible result is that it has successfully transformed itself into the Hub of Planning Stillborn Hubs. Next up on the agenda is the regionalization of hubba hubba, per this Joongang Ilbo report on ROKGOV’s latest exercise in sterile onanistic futility: Nation to split into 7 regional blocs.
The Associated Press has an interesting piece up about the 40th re-union of the crew of the ill-fated USS Pueblo, now (still) displayed by the NORKS as a war trophy and an incitement to anti-Americanism more than 40 years after the NORKS seized the unarmed vessel in international waters on January 23, 1968.
The NORKS moved it out of Pyeongyang to Nampo when Ambassador James Kelly visited in 1999, but returned it to Pyeongyang later, where it is moored in the Daedong River in the center of the city. The NORKS reportedly also more recently made an offer to repatriate the Pueblo in exchange for the obeisance visit of another senior US Government official and the remittance of suitable tribute extortion aid.
Some interesting context:
According to the Wikipedia article referenced earlier,
facts have come to light that indicate that USS Pueblo was captured by North Korea at the instigation of the Soviet Union, which was seeking a cryptographic machine onboard to match with a key provided to the Soviets by the spy John Walker.
And, further historically-speaking, the Pueblo Incident has been played by the NORKS for all its worth as an echo of the infamous M/S [S/S ?] General Sherman Incident. In 1866 a privately-owned American-registered merchantman, the General Sherman, sailed uninvited up the Taedong River toward Pyongyang, where she ran aground and was destroyed by Korean shore batteries and troops, who burned the ship and killed the entire crew. Kim Il Sung claimed that his great-grandfather was involved, fabricating a tale that portrays his great grandfather Kim Ung-u as a brave fighter against the “U.S. imperialists,” who led the attack on the General Sherman, and thereby purportedly initiated Korean anti-American struggles in the 1880s. Apart from the absence of any tenable evidence of Kim’s grandfather’s involvement, another small problem with that account is that the General Sherman, although owned by a private US commercial shipping firm, was operating under charter to the British trading firm Meadows and Co., based in Tientsin (present day Tianjin), China. So it was the Brits, not the Americans, and certainly no US government entity, who actually initiated and provided the motive for this ill-begotten commercial foray into Korea that, by all accounts, was as much an attempt to extort as offer trade.
Because the General Sherman was US-flagged, however, the Korean destruction of the ship and killing of its crew resulted in a US inquiry into the matter under color of the well-established right of nations to protect their commercial shipping. And that first brought Korea to the attention of Admiral (then Captain) Robert J. Schufeldt who was detailed six months later in 1867 to take the USS Wachusett to investigate the fate of the General SHerman and its crew. Schufeldt’s voyage was hampered and then abandoned on account of bad weather; but later he posed as the very self-consciously styled “Perry of Korea”, “opening” Korea to the United States by negotiating the May 1882 (Chemulpo) Treaty of Amity and Commerce that laid the basis for the subsequent very checkered history of US - Korean relations.
Andrei Lankov’s latest, in his ongoing series of interesting columns about Korean history in The Korea Times, is about the assassination and historical status of Korean terrorist “freedom fighter” Kim Gu.
One of the things that Lankov fails to mention, though, is that Kim Gu himself - who looks more like the Mad Hatter from Alice in Wonderland - had quite a record of political assassinations, and old-fashioned murder, not all of the victims of which were ostensible Japanese colonialist oppressors of Korea.
In fact, his first victim was an ordinary Japanese civilian, a traveling salesman of a Nagasaki trading company on a business trip to Chemulpo (Incheon), whom Kim killed in an effort to make a name for himself as an avenger of the brutal and senseless murder of Korea’s Empress Myeongseong (Queen Min). She was assassinated in the so-called Eulmi Incident, of October 8, 1895, by a group of Japanese ruffians and Japanese and Korean troops organized by the rogue Japanese minister to Korea, Miura Goro.
He also excelled at the elimination of rival Korean politicians, such as Song Chin-U, editor of the Tonga Ilbo and leader of the Korea Democratic Party in 1945 [Eckert, Lee, Lew, Robinson & Wagner, Korea Old and New: A History (351)], and he is likely to also have been involved in the elimination of the moderate leftist leader Yo Un-hyong.
More perspective on Kim can be gained from three more or less mainstream histories picked of the shelf at random:
The Korean Independence Party [of Kim Ku) carried out terrorist activities against the Japanese. Yi Pong-ch’ang, one of its members, attempted to assassinate the Japanese emperor at the Sakurada Gate in Tokyo, and another member, Yun Pong-gil, threw bombs at the Japanese attending a celebration of the Japanese emperor’s birthday at Hungk’ou Park in Shanghai on April 29, 1932, wounding many prominent Japanese such as Shigemitsu Mamoru, General Shirakawa Yoshinori, and Admiral Nomura Kichisaburo. Shirakawa and another Japanese died of wounds. Andrew Nahm, Korea: Tradition and Transformation (315).
Whereas the independence movement in Manchuria was carried on mainly through armed resistance, there were those Korean exiles in China who adopted terrorist tactics in their fight against Japan. The best known organizations of this sort were Kim Won-Bong’s Uiyoltan (Righteous Brotherhood) and Kim Ku’s Aeguktan ( Patriots Corps). The bombing and assassination plots carried out by these groups were almost too numerous to count, but the best known are the terrorist attacks on the offices of the Oriental Development Company and other targets in Seoul in 1926 by Na Sok-chu of the Uiyoltan, the attempt to assassinate the Japanese emperor by hand grenade in 1932 by Yi Pong-ch’ang (1908-1932) of the Aeguktan, and the bomb set off by Yun Pong-gil, also a member of the Aeguktan, in Shanghai’s Hung-kuo Park in 1932, killing or wounding a number of high-ranking Japanese military and civil officials. Ki-Baik Lee, A New History of Korea (365-66).
The Korean exile movement in China had remained factionalized through the 1930s. Kim Ku trained military forces and organized assassinations and bombings in China and Korea proper. Eckert, Lee, Lew, Robinson & Wagner, Korea Old and New: A History (324).
After the Manchurian Incident of 1931, the Provisional Government entrusted Kim Gu with the authority to carry out "special operations" [emphasis added] against Japan. Kim Gu organized the Korean Patriot Corps (Aegukdan) in Shanghai in 1926. In January 1932, Yi Bong-chang, a member of Kim Gu’s Patriot COrps, attaempted to assassinate the Japanese Emperor with a hand grenade, but failed. However,, on April 29 of the same year, Yun Bong-gil, also a member of Kim Gu’s Patriot Corps, successfully detonated a bomb in Shanghai’s Hung-kou Park, killing or wounding a number of high-ranking Japanese and civil officials. Lee Hyun-hee, Park Sung-soo and Yoon Nae-hyun, New History of Korea (557-558).
All of which leaves one feeling less than sympathetic for Kim when he was killed by An Du-hui, probably at the instigation of Syngman Rhee (although, as Lankov observes, that probably will never be proven).
The interesting aspect of Kim’s historical status mentioned by Lankov is the approbation in which he is held by all segments of South Korean society, including the Left, notwithstanding that he was a staunch anti-communist and anti-leftist — a fact that could be a hook for an interesting exploration of the strange political permutations resulting from the growth and development of modern nationalism in Korea since the late 19th century.
Addendum: The question of Kim Gu’s status as a terrorist caused something of a stir not long ago when a visiting English professor of Korean Studies called him such in a summer session at Korea University, as reported here and here and commented on at legnth by the usual suspects (including yours truly) at The Marmot’s Hole here and here.
Cross Reference: Gusts of Popular Feeling has an interesting picture of Kim Gu’s funeral on July 5, 1949, along with the New York Times article about him on the occasion, here. One of his commenters reminds us that Kim was one of the Presidents of the Provisional Government of Korea in exile in China, in which capacity he declared war against Germany and Japan in December 1941.
Boris over at SquatRx, one of the best training-related blogs I know, has pulled the trigger on Work Your Weakness Month. The implication, I guess, is that one should work one perceived weakness. So besides the fact that I’ve mapped out a three month program, I suppose my plan is equally (and characteristically) over the top in terms of its goals. I aim to increase my 1RM on each of my squat, deadlift and bench by 100 pounds. On the other hand, I think that what’s been impeding my progress lately in all my routines, including my non-training-related activities, is lack of concentration. This has two faces: lack of concentration itself and failure to sustain concentration from workout to workout (I generally don’t have a problem remaining focused during a training session - as long as I’m switched on to begin with - unless and until I hit the wall physically). I’ve come to this conclusion because of my experience over the past three weeks - yeah, I started before September. What I’ve discovered is that I may have set my goals too low. In the squat for example, before I started, I was pretty much stuck, after two years of training starting at age 55, at ~255 pounds. In three workouts, however, I’ve already gotten to 2×5@315. Here are this morning’s full squat stats:
20 reps@42.5 lbs; 20@95; 10@135; 10@185; 10@225; 10@285; 5@305; 5 @315; 10@225×5.
Total weight: 14,180 lbs. ET 59 minutes.
I think the dispositive factor in making these uncharacteristically quick gains is my concentration; settling 300+ pounds in the low bar position on my upper back seems to focus my mind without my having to make much effort at it. That comes with deciding actually to attempt squatting it. And then holding my glutes, hams, quads, core etc. together in order not to collapse under the weight. (I work in a proper cage w/ safety bars and, with anything over 275, a spotter; but psychologically, those don’t really help, since what’s intimidating is the felt potential of the weight to crush you.) But the initial shock of taking the weight on my back seems to prime the pump and make it easier to take the decision to squat. And once my focus is engaged, I find the weight very tough but, also, very moveable.
I’ve made gains of similar magnitude in the same time frame in the bench and deadlift.
So for now I’m considering concentration as my weakness, and I’ll concentrate simply on making gains of the most weight possible from week to week to challenge, test and strengthen it in the spirit of Musashi Miyamoto’s aphorism:
The purpose of today’s training is to defeat yesterday’s understanding.
Who knows? Maybe by the end of twelve weeks, I will have surpassed my numerical weight goals by not having aimed for them.
Bodybuilding.Com has a great clip of The World’s Strongest Man, Mariusz Pudzianowski, doing squats.
Mariusz Pudzianowski Doing Squats on The Fit Show
(Sorry about the ads at the beginning; persevere; it’s worth it for the “20 Kilo more” and “Now is heavy” — not to mention the 800 pound squat.)
I can’t lift anywhere near as much as Pudzianowski . His personal best (PB) in the squat is 826 pounds (375 kg). But I didn’t start lifting when I was 13, I’m not 31, and I don’t weigh 310 pounds. I’m 57, I started when I was 55 and I “only” weigh 225 (@ 12% body fat, down from 250 @ ~30+% BF 2 years ago). But I feel the weight brother! The relevant part of my training log for today is as follows:
Squats: 20 reps@42.5 lbs; 20@95; 10@135; 10@185; 10@225; 10@285; 5@305; 5 @315; 10@225×5.
Total weight: 14,180 lbs. ET 59 minutes.
Now IS heavy!
(BTW, that picture of Mariusz is what I mean by “gettin’ on the gorilla suit”.
I laughed so hard when I read about it this morning that I knew I wanted to write it up, but I was too busy until tonight - places to go, people to see, bidness to get done — and, in the meantime, the Marmot already has publicized the story of the downtrodden pimps with the hearts of gold so cruelly harrassed by the police who insist on shutting them down. So I’ll content myself with directing your attention to this nugget in the story:
“We are the same Korean citizens as other lay people. In this sense, at least, the police should guarantee our rights to live. But now the police are relentless,” a pimp Cho Hyun-hee told The Korea Times.
Pimps in the district said they did not oppose the action but found it too harsh. They said they want to sit at a negotiation table with the police to find a practical win-win solution.
That about sums it up when it comes to the subject of Korean attitudes about the rule of law.
But don’t think it’s just the lowlifes who believe and act this way. They’re just trying to get the same action as the major players. The police officer in charge has justified his offensive against the brothels in part because of their complicity in the tax evasion that is pandemic in Korea. But as Wedge reminds us in The Marmot’s comment section, that’s a crime in Korea that on the 100 Million Dollar Level doesn’t even warrant a single day in jail because, as the judge in the case involving former Samsung Chairman (and still eminence grise) Lee Kun-Hee,explained
“We ruled against an actual jail sentence as the degree of illegality was not significant enough.”
I gotta give Korea’s finest credit, though, for keeping their guns in their holsters - at least as far as we know, for now.
According to the World Health Organization, via VOA News, suicide is the fourth leading cause of death in South Korea. World Health Organization figures show that in 2004, South Korea’s suicide rate was almost 24 per 100,000 people. That is more than double the rate in 1985 - of nine per 100,000. According to a Korean government study, reported by OhMyNews, in 2005 Korea’s suicide rate was the highest among the OECD countries with which Korea is classed and with which it so ardently wishes to be compared - a fact confirmed by the OECD itself in a report released in 2007, as described in the Chosun Ilbo and the LA Times.
Over at 우물안개구리 (Frog in a Well), Jonathan Dresner makes some cutting remarks about Edward Luttwak’s characterizing the Korean War as a “sideshow” in the post-WW2 crusade against communism while Luttwak tries favorably to compare the Shrub in his manifestation as Guy de Lusignan to President “The Buck Stops Here” Truman. I’m not much interested in Dresner’s poleaxing of Luttwak’s laughably clumsy attempt to rationalize Bush’s policies regarding radical Islamism. And Dresner makes a fair point in observing that it seems odd at the very least to describe the Korean War, where not only South Koreans, but US and UN troops, engaged in actual, hard fighting, not only with the North Koreans, but the Chinese and even the Russians, as a sideshow to the purportedly main event in Europe.
But in fact, as evidenced perhaps most dramatically by Dean Acheson’s apparent exclusion of Korea from the US security perimeter in his famous January 12, 1950 Washington Press Club Speech, the US did regard Korea as little more than a bit of miscellaneous baggage in the grand terminus of global security arrangements at the end of WW2. It was only because the North Korean invasion six months later on June 25, 1950 jolted it that the US, very reactively and haltingly at first, as recounted by Acheson himself in Present at the Creation and, in somehwat more detail in the expanded portion theref printed under the title The Korean War, began to re-conceptualize Korea as an arena of and increasingly alarming concern and rapidly growing significance. The suddenness and extreme violence with which Korea was transformed into a critical theatre in the confrontation with Communism which, despite its still secondary importance, nevertheless (as recounted by Acheson) signally affected the post-publication and pre-promulgation development and interpretation of NSC 68, the charter of America’s post-war global security policy and anti-communism and the harbinger of so many other fundamental changes in the American polity (not to mention its massive impact on Korea!) cannot really be grasped unless one appreciates how much less than even a sideshow Korea was in American perceptions of global order and security before 6/25.